

ACCESSION #: 9611260087
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2 PAGE: 1 OF 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000425

TITLE: TURBINE/RX TRIP WHILE RESTORING MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE TO SERVICE

EVENT DATE: 10/23/96 LER #: 96-008-00 REPORT DATE:

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000

OPERATING MODE: 1 POWER LEVEL: 64

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION:

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME: Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and COMPLIANCE: (706) 826-3209
Compliance

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:

REPORTABLE NPRDS:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

On October 23, 1996, at 1707 EDT, an automatic turbine/reactor trip signal was received in the control room while personnel were returning main feed pump turbine B (MFPTB) to service. The main feedwater system isolated and the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system actuated, as designed. Operators responded by stabilizing steam generator water levels and transitioning the unit to normal operation in Mode 3 (hot standby).

The cause of this event was a procedure that did not address proper steam supply valve sequencing when restoring a main feed pump turbine to service. Opening the steam supply above seat drain valves to the MFPTB, prior to opening an exhaust line, resulted in rupture of MFPTB's 15 psig rupture disk. When the drain valves were subsequently closed, outside air was inducted through the ruptured disk, past a leaking exhaust line valve, and into the condenser, where a low vacuum condition led to the turbine/reactor trip. The procedure was changed, the rupture disk replaced, and MFPTB was returned to service.

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A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because an unplanned reactor protection system actuation occurred.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 (power operation) at 64 percent of rated thermal power. Main feed pump turbine B (MFPTB) was being restored to service. Other than that described herein, there was no other inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 23, 1996, personnel were restoring MFPTB to service following repairs. At 1707 EDT, an automatic turbine/reactor trip signal was received in the control room. The main feedwater system isolated and the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system actuated, as designed. Operators responded by stabilizing steam generator water levels and transitioning the unit to normal operation in Mode 3 (hot standby).

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event was an inadequate procedure. Procedure 13615-2, "Condensate and Feedwater Systems," did not clearly address the proper sequence for opening steam line valves to a MFPT when restoring the turbine to service while at power. On October 23, 1996, the steam supply above seat drain valves were opened prior to opening the exhaust line valve. Although the exhaust line valve was leaking by to the condenser, main steam line pressure in the MFPTB was great enough to rupture a 15 psig rupture disk. When operators subsequently closed the steam supply above seat drain valves, outside air was inducted through the ruptured disk and past the leaking exhaust line valve, resulting in a low condenser vacuum condition that led to the turbine/reactor trip.

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E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The main feedwater system isolated and the AFW system actuated, as designed. Control room operators properly responded to stabilize SG water levels. No problems arose following the trip that prevented

operators from transitioning the plant to stable operation in Mode 3. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) The rupture disk was replaced, and MFPTB was returned to service.
- 2) Procedure 13615-2 was revised to add specific guidance for the sequence of opening steam line valves. Procedure 13615-1 will be revised by November 30, 1996.
- 3) The leaking exhaust valve will be repaired during the next appropriate unit outage.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Components:
None

2) Previous Similar Events:
None

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:
Main Feedwater System - SJ
Auxiliary Feedwater System - BA

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Georgia Power
C. K. McCoy the southern electric system
Vice President, Nuclear
Vogtle Project November 14, 1996

LCV-0908

Docket No. 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Ladies and Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-96-8
TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP WHILE RESTORING
MAIN FEED PUMP TURBINE TO SERVICE

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby submits the enclosed report associated with an event that occurred on October 23, 1996.

Sincerely,

C. K. McCoy
CKM/TEW/afs

Enclosure: LER 2-96-8

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. L. Wheeler, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. C. R. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

*** END OF DOCUMENT ***
